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The Federalist Society for Law  
and Public Policy 
presents 
ORIGINALISM AND CRIMINAL LAW AND 
PROCEDURE 
2005  National  Lawyer’s  Convention 
November 10, 2005 
PANELISTS: 
Professor Ronald J. Allen, John Henry Wigmore Professor of Law, 
Northwestern University School of Law 
Professor Carol Steiker, Howard J. and Katherine W. Aibel Professor of 
Law, Harvard Law School 
Professor Craig S. Lerner, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and 
Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law 
Hon. Christopher A. Wray, King & Spalding litigation partner and Former 
Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice 
Hon. Edith Brown Clement, United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit 
(moderator) 
 
JUDGE CLEMENT: I am Edith Brown Clement, also known as Joy 
Clement, from the Fifth Circuit, but actually I live in the Fourth Circuit 
now,  thanks  to  Katrina.    I’m  glad  we  have  a  number  of  people  here  to  dis-
cuss originalism and criminal procedure. 
As you all realize, there are several provisions in the United States 
Constitution to affect criminal law, and most specifically,  criminal proce-
dure, which we will be discussing.  The problem is what to do with the 
technology that has developed over the past 200 plus years.  There are sev-
eral   areas   that   I’m   sure   the   founders   didn’t   contemplate,   such   as   digital  
communications, heat sensors which locate lamps growing marijuana, and 
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the home of Black Berry/cell phone/future means of communication, which 
reminds me, please turn yours off or silence them.  Mine just rang, so I 
know  they’re  probably  not  all  off. 
We have a fascinating panel this afternoon.  We have three professors 
and a lawyer who has a wealth of experience in the criminal law field.  Our 
first speaker is Craig Lerner.  He is a professor at George Mason University 
School of Law, where he has been for five years.  Before that, he was asso-
ciated with the Office of Independent Counsel for several years, and he 
practiced in the white-collar criminal field and the communications field.  
He  was  a  law  clerk  in  the  D.C.  Circuit,  so  I’m  sure  he  was  exposed  a  lot  of  
criminal law there.  Also, he was a teaching fellow at Harvard, which 
makes sense because he was an undergraduate of Harvard, and also a grad-
uate of Harvard Law, and then in his spare time got a masters at the Uni-
versity of Chicago.  He has published a great deal, and I like some of the 
titles.  I will read them to you—Reasonable Suspicion and Mere Hunches;1 
my favorite one, because I am from New Orleans, Louisiana, is Legislators 
as the American Criminal Class.2  I’m  also  curious  about  The United States 
PATRIOT Act: Promoting the Cooperation of Foreign Intelligence Gather-
ing and Law Enforcement.3  There may be something we can discuss about 
the PATRIOT Act with respect to the separation of powers, since they now 
want  federal  judges  to  report  to  Congress  anyone  who’s  sentenced,  so  that  
they  can  evaluate  whether  it’s  correct  or  not.    I  think  that  could  be  a  prob-
lem.  He has also published two articles on probable cause and an article on 
joint defense agreements, which as you all know is just asking for trouble. 
Our second panelist is Professor Robert Allen.  He is presently at the 
Northwestern University School of Law.  He did his undergraduate work in 
mathematics at Marshall University, which is helpful if you do have to deal 
with  the  sentencing  guidelines,  since  most  lawyers  don’t  do  math.    Then,  he  
went to law school at the University of Michigan.  He is an internationally 
recognized expert in the fields of evidence, procedure, and constitutional 
law.    He’s  published  many  books,  and  90  articles  and  major  law  review  ar-
ticles in major law reviews.  You may recognize him because he is in the 
national broadcast media, discussing constitutional law and criminal justice 
quite   frequently.     He’s   also  held  professorships  before  he  went   to  North-
western,  at  Iowa  and  at  Duke,  and  he’s  lectured  at  a  number  of  national  and  
international laws schools.  He has also been invited to give lectures to the 
governments of China, Mexico, Trinidad, and Tobago.  He spent the past 
ten years of his research focused on the nature of juridical proof.  He is a 
member of American Law Institute, and he has chaired the Evidence Sec-
 
 1 Craig S. Lerner, Reasonable Suspicion and Mere Hunches, 59 VAND. L. REV. 407 (2006). 
 2 Craig S. Lerner, Legislators  as   the  “American  Criminal  Class”:  Why  Congress   (Sometimes) 
Protects the Rights of Defendants, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 599 (2004). 
 3 Craig S. Lerner, The USA Patriot Act: Promoting the Cooperation of Foreign Intelligence Ga-
thering and Law Enforcement, 11 GEO. MASON L.REV. 493 (2003). 
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tion of the Association of American Law Schools.  He was Vice Chair of 
the Rules of the Procedure and Evidence Committee at the ABA, and he 
has also served as a Commissioner of the Illinois Supreme Court. 
Our third panelist is Christopher Wray, who was and is a litigator at 
King & Spalding.  He presently is the Chairman of the Special Matters and 
Government Investigations Practice group, where he deals with securities 
and fraud matters, as well as white collar criminal issues.  For two years, he 
worked as the assistant attorney general in charge of the Department of Jus-
tice (“DOJ”) Criminal Division.  During that time, there was an effort to 
address the wave of corporate fraud scandals, and he attempted to restore 
some integrity to the United States financial markets, which I think has 
been successful.  As Head of the Criminal Division, he led investigation, 
prosecution, and policy development in nearly all of the fields of federal 
criminal law, specifically intellectual property piracy and cyber crime, and 
racketeering.     He  has  played  an  integral  part  in  the  DOJ’s  response  to the 
September 11 attacks and has played a key role in the oversight of the legal 
and operational actions in the continuing war on terrorism.  He spent from 
1997 to 2001 in Atlanta as  an  Assistant  United  States  Attorney,  where  I’m  
sure he got a lot of criminal experience also, and he served as a law clerk in 
the Fourth Circuit.  He graduated from Yale as an undergraduate, and as a 
lawyer. 
Our fourth panelist—ladies last—is Carol Steiker.  She is presently a 
professor at the Harvard Law School.  She graduated from Harvard, Rad-
cliffe Colleges, and Harvard Law School.  She served as law clerk to Judge 
J. Skelley Wright, who is from New Orleans, on the D.C. Circuit, and also 
to Justice Thurgood Marshall of the Supreme Court, and she got most of 
her criminal law reality check serving as a public defender in the District of 
Columbia, I would imagine.  She has written numerous articles on criminal 
law, criminal procedure, and capital punishment.  Most recently, she served 
on the Board of Editors for the second edition of the Encyclopedia of Crime 
and Justice,4 and   she’s  working   on   two   lengthy   projects.      One   is   on   the  
changing face of capital punishment in America; the other one is on mercy 
and institutions of criminal justice.  She served as a consultant and expert 
witness on issues of criminal justice for many non-profit organizations, as 
well as for federal and state legislatures. 
I  think  we’ll  have  an  interesting  afternoon.    Please  give  these panelists 
your attention.  After they address you, then the panelists will have the op-
portunity to cross-examine the other panelists, and we will then open the 
floor to questions.  Thank you very much. 
 
PROFESSOR LERNER: Thank you.  I was asked to go first because 
 
 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME & JUSTICE (Joshua Dressler ed., Gale Group 2d ed. 2001) (1982). 
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the thought was that I would defend originalism and present an ample tar-
get to my co-panelists. 
Soon after the President nominated Harriet Miers to the Supreme 
Court, Judge Robert Bork, as you may have seen, published a scathingly 
critical editorial in the Wall Street Journal criticizing Miers for not being 
an originalist.5  According to Bork, judges who are not originalists end up 
legislating from the bench, and for originalists this is bad, obviously, be-
cause  it’s  an  illegitimate  enterprise.  Judges, as we heard repeatedly during 
the aborted Miers nomination, are charged with applying the law, not mak-
ing it up. 
Second, this enterprise is bad for functionalist reasons.  Judges are not 
picked or trained to assess the costs and benefits of newly minted public 
policy rules, nor do they have staffs equipped to assist them in these endea-
vors.  As we know, the staffs that Supreme Court justices have consist of a 
quartet of fawning 27-year-olds straight from the intellectual hothouses of 
Cambridge and New Haven. 
A third argument for originalism is an aesthetic one.  This is my favo-
rite.  Supreme Court justices should remain securely cosseted in their judi-
cial robes.  Originalism, as an interpretive methodology, constrains a free-
wheeling, let-it-all-hang-out jurisprudence that is aesthetically very bad for 
the country.  Criminal procedure provides many examples, I fear, of terror-
ist prudential deformities that do not pleasantly engage the eye.  Questions 
about police in criminal trials seem to fire the imagination of Supreme 
Court justices far more than ERISA preemption issues, and they promptly 
abandon the tedious constitutional text to ruminate on philosophy and mo-
rality. 
Let me give you one example: Mapp v. Ohio6—of course, the grandfa-
ther of modern American criminal procedure.  In concluding his decision 
requiring the exclusionary rule in every state court in America, Justice 
Clark cast off his judicial robes, revealing I fear the emaciated and un-
sightly  figure  of  the  philosopher  king.    “Our  decision,”  he  intoned  without  
the  slightest  hint  of  irony,  “[is]  founded  on  reason  and  truth.”7  On political 
legitimacy, functionalist, and aesthetic grounds, Supreme Court justices 
should wear traditional robes.  Originalism is attractive because it provides 
constraints against extrajudicial ruminations on reason and truth, rumina-
tions that many Supreme Court justices are supremely ill suited to engage 
in. 
Yet, one cannot leave it at that.  Of course, an obvious response to 
Judge Bork in this argument so far is that I have posited a choice between 
originalism and letting-it-all-hang-out jurisprudence between the two.  Of 
 
 5 Robert H. Bork, Slouching Towards Miers, WALL. ST. J., Oct. 19, 2005, at A12. 
 6 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
 7 Id. at 660. 
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course, originalism is preferable.  But more commonly, a choice confront-
ing a judge today is not originalism versus letting it all hang out, but origi-
nalism—at least as some pedant might discover it—and following decades 
of precedent that might have strayed far from the Constitution.  To the ex-
tent that my aesthetic objection to non-originalism is a reaction to Arian 
empty philosophizing, it might seem that a precedent-bound jurisprudence 
is preferable to originalist recourse to first principles. 
I think the issue is starkly posed in the criminal procedure context, 
where you have a number of cases like Mapp,8 Miranda,9 and Katz,10 that 
have essentially replaced the Constitution as guiding principles.  Justice 
Scalia has said that almost every originalist would adulterate the strong 
medicine of originalism with a doctrine of stare decisis, but when does the 
originalist hearken to the originalist voice of the Constitution, and when 
does he follow meekly in the footsteps of his predecessors, however way-
ward  their  path?    That  is  the  question,  and  I  don’t  think  Justices  Scalia  and  
Thomas agree on that. 
I   don’t   think   there’s   a   simple   algorithm,   a   scientific   solution to that 
problem.    I  don’t  think  this,  however,  is  an  irrefutable  problem.    These  dis-
agreements notwithstanding, originalism I think might most be modestly 
cast as an interpretive tool to assist judges when considering how much de-
ference is owed to prior decisions, and the appropriate level of caution or 
enthusiasm and extent of the examining or limiting those precedents.  
That’s  the  argument  for  originalism. 
The basic criticism originalism, of course, in bare bones, is that the 
cultural, technological, legal environment has been so transformed over the 
past 210 years that the original meaning of the Constitution does not and 
should not provide any or much guidance.  My first reaction to this criti-
cism is always to conceive it: if courts, and particularly the Supreme Court, 
were in the business of fashioning policy solutions for all the ills that afflict 
us, the Constitution, its text and its meaning, would indeed supply inade-
quate  guidance.    But  if  the  Supreme  Court’s  role  were  more  modestly  cast  
to be  judges,  I’m  not  so  certain  the  Constitution  is  radically  deficient. 
On the descriptive claim that originalism does not play a significant 
role in modern criminal procedure, it might be sufficient to note the re-
markable uptake in references to 18th-century English and American police 
and trial practices and treatises in Supreme Court criminal procedures over 
the past 15 years.  Of course, skeptics of originalism might counter that all 
these references to Entick v. Carrington,11 Camden, Storey, Cooke—these 
are all simply rhetorical parsley.  There they are for show to satisfy aes-
thetes like me.  Under this view, Justice Scalia is doing exactly what Wil-
 
 8 Id. at 643. 
 9 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 10 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 11 Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (1765). 
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liam  Brennan  and  Earl  Warren  did;;  he’s  following  his  moral  intuition,  but  
he’s  simply  covering  up  better.    I am not persuaded by this criticism. 
There is ample evidence that originalism is doing independent work, 
that it is driving many recent opinions.  Academic critics who once mocked 
what  they  called  to  Scalia’s  Law  and  Order  originalism12 have been proven 
wrong again and again in recent years as he has voted on originalist 
grounds to extend protections for criminal defendants.  The case last term, 
Crawford v. Washington, in which Justice Scalia overruled a 24-year-old 
precedent and expanded the reach of the Confrontation Clause on original-
ist grounds, held that the Sixth Amendment required the exclusion of testi-
monial evidence, however reliable, unless the defendant was permitted to 
cross examine him.13  Of course, the Apprendi14 line of cases were all de-
signed to ensure, consistent with the original meaning of the Constitution 
or what at least has been alleged to be the original meaning of the Constitu-
tion—I’m  not  so  certain  about  the  historical  materials  here—that juries, not 
judges, make factual findings that justify conviction and punishment. 
Another remarkable example of Justice Scalia as an originalist civil li-
bertarian is his concurring opinion in Minnesota v. Dickerson,15 in which 
he suggested that the uncertainty about the constitutionality of risks during 
brief   interrogatories   stopped,   because   he   frankly   doubted   “whether   the  
fiercely proud men who adopted our Fourth Amendment would have al-
lowed themselves to be subjected, on mere suspicion of being armed and 
dangerous,  to  such  indignity.”16 
Or finally, consider   Justice   Scalia’s   dissenting   opinion   in  County of 
Riverside v. McLaughlin, where the Court considered the constitutionality 
of a local practice of waiting as long as 48 hours before providing an ar-
rested person with a judicial determination of probable cause.17  Scalia 
noted  Storey’s  claim  that  the  Fourth  Amendment  was  “little  more  than  an  
affirmance of a great constitutional doctrine of the common law.”18  He lec-
tured the majority that the Court should balance law enforcement interests 
and privacy concerns only when confronted with novel issues of reasona-
bleness.19  No balancing was appropriate in resolving these questions on 
which a clear answer already existed in 1791 and has been generally ad-
hered to by traditions of our society ever since. 
Well, not surprisingly,  given  Scalia’s  view  of  the  Fourth  Amendment,  
 
 12 Thomas Y. Davies, The Fictional Character of Law-and-Order Originalism: A Case Study of 
the Distortions and Evasions of Framing-Era Arrest Doctrine in Atwater v. Lago Vista, 37 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 239 (2002). 
 13 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 14 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
 15 Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366 (1993). 
 16 Id. at 381 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 17 County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 59–71 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 18 Id. at 71. 
 19 Id. at 59–71. 
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he has ridiculed many modern criminal procedure opinions, and perhaps no 
decision has received more derisive abuse from him than Katz v. United 
States.20  That was the case, of course, that involved a wiretap on a public 
telephone booth.  The Court, or at least Justice Harlan, held that the Fourth 
Amendment protected—this was wonderful—actual subjective expecta-
tions of privacy that society recognizes as reasonable, or something along 
those lines.21  As Scalia noted, this test is self-indulgent.22  It lacks any 
plausible  foundation  in  the  text  of  the  Fourth  Amendment.    And,  “unsurpri-
singly,   those   ‘actual   (subjective)   expectation[s]  of  privacy’   that   society   is  
prepared  to  recognize  as  ‘reasonable,’  .  .  .  bear an uncanny resemblance to 
those  expectations  of  privacy  that  this  Court  considers  reasonable.”23 
Now, Katz, according to the familiar story, uprooted decades of per-
haps already withering precedent, which had premised the Fourth Amend-
ment on protection of property rights, not privacy interests.  Chief Justice 
Taft’s  opinion   in  Olmstead v. the United States24 is the classic originalist 
statement  of  this  view.    Government  agents  in  that  case  tapped  Olmstead’s  
telephone lines, outside his home.25  And Taft, relying on what he regarded 
as the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment, found no constitutional 
violation, the simple reason being that there was no physical trespass on 
Olmstead’s   property.26  Now   Taft’s   view,   I   don’t   think,   was   a   frivolous  
one.  It would  seem  to  hew  closely  to  Lord  Camden’s  statement  in  Entick v. 
Carrington, that “our law holds the property of every man so sacred that no 
man can set foot  upon his  neighbor’s  close  without  his  leave.”27 
Also, the text of the Fourth Amendment, with its references to person, 
houses, papers, and effects, arguably suggests that physical intrusion is a 
necessary predicate for a Fourth Amendment violation.  That was, I think, 
Justice  Black’s  view,  dissenting  in  Katz.28  The story typically told in law 
schools today is that this absurd, hypertextual connection between property 
rights and the Fourth Amendment has been thankfully interred by cases 
such as Katz, where the Supreme Court replaced the antiquated originalist 
property paradigm with an updated modern privacy  paradigm.      It’s  a  nice  
story.      It’s   actually   something   of   a   fable,   as   Professor   Orin  Kerr,   who’s  
here, and may want to distance himself from everything I say, has written.29 
Doctrinally, to a remarkable extent, the Fourth Amendment is still 
about protecting property rights, not privacy interests.  Police can fly over 
 
 20 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 21 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 22 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
 23 Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 24 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807, 817 (1765). 
 28 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 364 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting). 
 29 Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531 (2005). 
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your land in helicopters.  They can insert undercover agents in your midst, 
wearing  wires.     You  can  search  your  friend’s  house  and  car,  finding  stuff  
that you own, none of which would violate your Fourth Amendment rights.  
So even muddled with cases like Katz, the originalist echoes can still be 
heard in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 
I   should   briefly   note   that  Scalia’s   originalism   in   the  Fourth  Amend-
ment  context  is  not  the  same  as  Taft’s.   He seems more willing to translate 
the Fourth Amendment to modern conditions, finding Fourth Amendment 
violations even in the absence of physical trespass.  This was of course illu-
strated in the Kyllo case, where Scalia found that the use of a thermal detec-
tion device to measure heat discharged from a home constituted a search, 
and in the absence of a warrant violated the Fourth Amendment.30 
Kyllo, for me, was a disappointing opinion because it seems that Sca-
lia, I think, abandoned a principle of rigorous originalism and seemed to 
ground his decision incredibly on Katz—yes, the much mocked Katz.  And 
second, because Scalia did not, I think, give sufficient credence to Justice 
Stevens’s  dissenting  objections  on pragmatic grounds that perhaps it is best 
to leave to the legislatures the responsibility of monitoring emerging tech-
nologies.  It might have been possible to craft something along the lines of 
an originalist opinion there, that a thermal detection device was in effect 
invading  Danny  Kyllo’s   castle,   and   if   the   ratifiers   of   the   Fourth  Amend-
ment could be brought back and asked, what do you think of thermal detec-
tion devices, they would say this is as horrifying as a physical intrusion on 
a home.  Frankly, I must   say   I   don’t   find   this   particularly   persuasive.      I  
couldn’t  care   less   if  police  directed   thermal  detection  device  at  my  home.    
Other people might feel differently, and I urge them to lobby Congress and 
state legislatures to convince them.  I am just unsure why courts are in-
volved in this enterprise. 
The  sky  won’t  fall  if  the  Fourth  Amendment  were  restricted  to  proper-
ty; that is, if we returned to originalist cramped vision of the Fourth 
Amendment.  Katz, for all the non-originalist flowery rhetoric, has been a 
meaningless decision, as Professor Kerr suggested.31  On the narrower issue 
confronted, Congress responded almost immediately by enacting Title III, 
which actually extends even more protections than what is guaranteed by 
the Fourth Amendment with respect to wiretaps.32 
Very briefly, two originalist agenda items/pure fantasies—one, maybe 
it’s  time  to  revisit  the  issue  of  incorporation.    You  know,  for  a  century  after  
the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, it was not thought that the 
Fourteenth Amendment applied each of the Bill of Rights protections 
 
 30 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) 
 31 See Orin S. Kerr, Digital Evidence and the New Criminal Procedure, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 279, 
307 (2005). 
 32 Criminal Resource Manual, 27 Electronic Surveillance, Title III, available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/crm00027.htm. 
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against the state exactly as they applied to the federal government.  I think 
this would be a very useful development, although perhaps unlikely. 
Second, circuit riding—let’s  bring  it  back.    It  didn’t stop existing until 
the mid-19th century.  You look at the Supreme Court today; God knows 
what the percentage of their docket is for criminal cases: a quarter, half?  
None of them have any experience adjudicating criminal law trials.  I 
mean, to some extent Justice Breyer, but typically not.  I think it would be 
very useful for them to actually have to spend some summer months, in-
stead of going to Salzburg, traveling the country and actually having to 
hear  criminal   trials  and  see  what   it’s   like   to  apply   the Miranda rules they 
dreamed up, with all their permutations, with all their exemptions.  And 
best of all—and here is where I think Judge Clement would appreciate 
this—maybe it would be nice for them to have decisions that can be ruled 
upon by the people who are generally in the business of being ruled upon 
by them. 
Thank you. 
 
JUDGE CLEMENT: Thank you, Professor Lerner.  You relax while 
they shoot at you. 
Professor Allen. 
 
PROFESSOR ALLEN: Thank   you,   Judge   Clement.      It’s   a   great  
pleasure and honor to be here—the  honor  from  the  fact  that  I’m  a  great  en-
thusiast   for   the  work   done   by   the  Federalist   Society,   although   I’ve   never  
been  a  member.    I  shouldn’t  confess  this,  but  I  will  correct  this  deficiency, I 
promise, as soon as we are done with this panel tonight—at least, unless 
you will to the contrary by the time we are done. 
I am very much also in the debt of the Federalist Society not only be-
cause of the tremendously valuable work that you do but because you pro-
duced three of my favorite people, my colleagues.  Steve Calabrese and 
Gary Lawson have been long-time colleagues of mine at Northwestern—
Gary unfortunately decided to go to that team that won the World Series 
last year—and John McGinnis, who is presently at Northwestern.  These 
are wonderful people, and they reflect all the best values of the Federalist 
Society.    They’re  always  open  to  new  ideas.    They’re  attentive  to  what  you  
have to say.  They respond in interesting and helpful ways, and keep bal-
ance, which is what the Federalist Society, from my point of view as an 
outsider, soon to be rectified, does. 
Now, the issue of originalism is interesting, and you can see the attrac-
tion of originalism, or textualism, or literalism in lots of ways.  And I think 
Craig identified the most important of which, which is all of these are me-
chanisms or searches for ways to constrain judicial decision-making, which 
otherwise to be unbounded and both unprincipled and inconsistent with 
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democratic decision-making and the like.  There is also a related, much 
more general point.  There is an attraction to theorizing of any kind.  Theo-
rizing allows a mass of information or a complicated situation to be re-
duced to a manageable size.  It often allows you to control that complex 
problem or process; to predict its outcome; and to change things as you go 
along.  So all of these, I think, at both the discrete level, why originalism 
itself is attractive and why theorizing more generally, are very critically 
important. 
The difficulty, though, is that what you arise—I’m  going  to  return  to  
this at the end of my remarks—when you theorize, you have to have a 
model that captures the reality appropriately; not exactly, not precisely at 
all respects, but appropriately for your purposes.    And  I  think  there’s  a  se-
rious question about whether any relatively simplistic theory of constitu-
tional interpretation does that with respect to the modern society in which 
we live. 
Now having said that, let me be clear about something.  You can ask 
three questions about anything, but certainly originalism.  You can ask the 
what, the why, and the should questions.  You ask questions about descrip-
tive  accuracy.    You  can  ask  questions  about  if  it  isn’t  or  is  descriptively  ac-
curate, why it is or isn’t  descriptively  accurate.    And  then  you  can  ask  the  
should  or  the  justificatory  question,  you  know,  what’s  justified,  originalism  
or as alternative, and so on. 
My self-conception, my self-conceit, if you will, is not that of a philo-
sopher; it is that of a scientist.  What interests me is how the system actual-
ly operates, statements that have truth value.  I want to describe accurately 
the legal process, predict it and so on, not attempt to engage in a normative 
debate  about   justification.     So   I’m  going   to  address the first two of those 
points,  the  “what”  and  the  “why”  questions,  and  leave  for  others  the  more  
normative  question  about  “should.” 
One of the reasons this question is interesting today is because of two 
important decisions, and Craig mentioned them both—Crawford on the one 
hand and Apprendi through Blakely33 to Booker34 on the other.  And I think 
this   puts  on   the   table   a  question  of  whether  we’re   seeing  a   resurgence  of  
interest in originalism or increasing significance and so on.  I have to tell 
you, I  think  the  answer  to  that  question  is  absolutely  not.    It’s  as  clear  as  a  
bell that there is not much to be said about the significance of originalism 
for constitutional criminal procedure.  Even the two cases in which you 
might plausibly make an argument that you see the influence of it—and by 
the  way,  I  want  to  be  clear  about  something.    When  I  say  “the  influence  of  
it,”   I’m   talking  about   the  work  product  of   the  Court,  not   individual   state-
ments by justices.  I mean, there obviously are justices who make claims 
 
 33 Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). 
 34 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
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along these lines with some regularity, but the issue is when they command 
a majority of the Court in a way that seems actually to solidify the signific-
ance of originalism. 
Crawford v. Washington is a good example.35  That’s   the  only   case,  
the only clear-cut case, in which you have a majority of the Court seeming 
to adopt an opinion that does, in fact, employ a very strong originalist lan-
guage.     And   I   think   that’s   true.     On   the  other  hand,  what  you  need   to  be  
aware of is that Crawford is one of a long series of the Court struggling 
with the relationship between the Hearsay Clause and the Confrontation 
Clause.  Now, it may turn out tomorrow or two years from now or ten years 
from now that this really was the beginning of the originalist revolution in 
criminal procedure.  I have to tell you, given the complexities of that rela-
tionship, I think we have to hold our breath and wait, and indeed the Court 
has already taken two cases this term in which I predict that they will make 
clear that the parameters of Crawford are quite constricted.  I may be right; 
I  may  be  wrong.    We’ll  see.    But  you  do  have  to  realize  that  is  one  of  a  se-
ries of cases struggling with this relationship.  Nonetheless, it is the one 
case in which there is a clear majority adopting this originalist perspective. 
In the Apprendi to Blakely to Booker line,  Scalia’s  opinion  does  try  to  
tie its results to an originalist argument.  The originalist argument has vir-
tually no evidence to support it.  Indeed, in the opinion itself, basically the 
argument is that although our originalist position has very little evidence, 
your—in  particular,  O’Connor’s—alternative  has  none.    So,  it’s  like  a  rela-
tive plausibility theory.  We have a psalm; you have none.  This is not a 
very robust originalist methodology. 
Moreover,  what’s  often  neglected  when  thinking  about  originalism  in  
Apprendi line of cases, in particular, Booker, is this is presented as the fed-
eral   guidelines   that   haven’t   been   struck   down   on   originalist   grounds.      In  
fact, what the Court probably did in Booker was uphold the guidelines.  
There are two opinions.  The second is more important than the first.  The 
second is the remedial opinion.  In that opinion, the Court concluded that 
you could indeed—the guidelines may not be mandatory, but they could be 
advisory and you can have appellate review of reasonableness of deviations 
from the guidelines.36  There’s  no  reason  why  Congress  can’t  give  teeth  to  
the standard of review.  If they do, essentially you end up with the guide-
lines in a somewhat different  vocabulary.     So,   that’s  not  very  strong  sup-
port for any kind of a robust originalism. 
If you get away from these two cases and you look at the general lay 
of the land, what you see are vast provinces in this territory that have vir-
tually no connection to originalist points of view.  Again, Craig mentioned 
some of them.  A Mapp and Katz regime in the Fourth Amendment is very 
 
 35 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 36 Booker, 543 U.S. at 268. 
ORIGINALISM_AND_CRIMINAL_Law_Panel_277-306 4/10/2008 6:46 PM 
288 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 11:277 
distant from it.  One of the cornerstones, really, the real cornerstone, I 
think, is not Mapp but Gideon.37  That’s  actually  the  real cornerstone as to 
interpretations of the meeting of habeas corpus, which—I  won’t   get   too  
technical here, but if we put aside habeas corpus,   it’s  Gideon which gave 
rise to modern constitutional criminal procedure.  You cannot justify the 
Gideon line of cases in any remotely originalist way, and one of the impor-
tant areas—not the entire area, but one of the important areas—of the Fifth 
Amendment is Miranda.    It’s  the  same  thing.    I  mean,  it’s  about  as  far  from  
originalism as one can possibly get. 
Nonetheless, to test this hypothesis, I decided to actually go through 
the last two terms and look all the decisions again.  I read them when they 
came  out,  but   some  of   them  aren’t   in  my  area  of   significant   interest,   so   I  
went back and looked at them all.  But what you get is a long list of cases, 
in many of which there could have been originalist arguments and not a 
single one was made.  By far the most striking of these on the counter side, 
on the counterbalance of the non-originalist, is Roper v. Simmons38—to my 
eyes it is a shocking opinion, and why were you not more up in arms?—
maybe you were and maybe I missed it; I was out of the country.  But you 
were not up in arms about this, the conclusion by a majority of the court 
with at least three members actually signing off on this, that it is up to them 
personally to decide the appropriateness of punishment under the Cruel and 
Unusual Punishment Clause.39  Now, I cannot imagine anything more like 
what Professor Graglia was railing against earlier today and more inappro-
priate from an originalist position. 
Now, I have two pages of notes, because one page is nothing but a 
listing of the cases from the last two terms in which originalist arguments 
might plausibly have been made—Fourth Amendment cases, confrontation 
cases, discovery cases, all kinds of stuff—and in not one of those was there 
a serious originalist argument.  I am happy go through them if anyone is 
interested, but I will not at this point.  But just to mention a couple of those, 
there are whole areas again that just have no relationship to any plausibly 
originalist position.  Think about the Brady line of cases.  There are con-
stantly Brady cases, discovery cases—that have nothing to do with what 
was  in  anybody’s  mind  200  years  ago. 
Think of the terror decisions, the three terror decisions—Hamdi,40 Pa-
dilla,41 and Guantánamo Bay.42  Again, not much there—there could have 
been—but not much there are about originalist perspectives.  Or, the Mi-
randa decisions of two terms ago, Patane,43 Seibert,44 and to a lesser extent 
 
 37 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
 38 Roper v. Simmons, 125 S.Ct. 1183 (2005). 
 39 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 40 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
 41 Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004). 
 42 Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004). 
 43 United States v. Patane 542 U.S. 630 (2004). 
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Fellers.45  Fellers is really a Sixth Amendment decision—again, no con-
nection here.  And I could—if in our discussion you want to talk about 
them - give you some more examples.  But if you look not at these two 
opinions, only one of which   is  plausibly  originalist,   and   that’s  Crawford; 
that’s   it.     So,   in   terms  of   the  what,   there   isn’t  much   there   to   suggest   that  
originalism is of any great significance, at least in terms of the decisions 
being reached now.  Now, the issue can be more complicated than that.  
Maybe   some   issues   are   settled,   and   they’re   settled   because   of   originalist  
positions and so on, so I mean, there are some interesting things to talk 
about here. 
All  right,  so  that’s  the  “what”  question.    What  about  the  “why”  ques-
tion?  Well,  you  know,  there’s  a  theory  out  there  that  the  fields  I’m  inter-
ested in, constitutional and criminal procedure and evidence, are kind of 
insulated from larger currents of constitutional law, in particular, and we 
suffer from it.  I have the exact opposite  view.    Now,  I  guess  that’s  not  a  
surprise.  I think you constitutional theorists out there suffer from not hav-
ing engaged with constitutional criminal procedure and evidence.  Why?  
Because these cases make you deal with the nitty-gritty of real life.  You 
know, in separation of powers cases, you can also often abstract away from 
what  the  real  issues  are.    It’s  really  hard  to  do  that  in  the  criminal  cases,  the  
evidentiary cases, and so on. 
And what am I getting at?  Well, when you look at it from this bottom 
of the heap perspective, which criminal procedure and evidence questions 
make you look at—you  know,  what’s  really  going  on?    Who  did  what  there  
for  a  man,  what’s  going  on?    You  see  a  couple  of  interesting  things.    One  
you see—and there are two I want to make—one is how dramatically the 
world has changed, and two, the implications of that for theorizing, the 
point  I  said  I’d  come  back  to  at  the  end. 
First of all, obviously some things are decided consistent with what 
you might claim to be an originalist position.  But a lot of what matters to 
the criminal process exists in a world that simply was not contemplated ei-
ther 200 years ago, or if you want to talk about the Due Process Clause, 
150 or so years ago.  My favorite example is wiretapping.  No one, not 
even Ben Franklin flying his kite in rough weather, was thinking about 
wiretapping.  So now, what to do with an originalist position when a prob-
lem simply was not contemplated? 
Appeals and the right to counsel—there were some appeals in some 
states in  various  ways,  and  very  odd  modern  points  of  view,  but  there’s  no  
view that appeals were a necessary part of a criminal process.  The old 
Western   slogan,   “give   them   a   fair   trial   and   hang   them,”   is   right.      There  
were no appeals.  You gave them a fair trial, and you hanged them.  In the 
 
 44 Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004). 
 45 Fellers v. United States, 540 U.S. 519 (2004). 
ORIGINALISM_AND_CRIMINAL_Law_Panel_277-306 4/10/2008 6:46 PM 
290 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 11:277 
late 1880s, criminal appeals were allowed in federal court for the first time.  
Now, there were some peculiar ways you can sometimes get a review and 
some states did different things and so on.  But now much of the world cen-
ters on appeals.  No one was thinking about this. 
What  about   the  police?     The  police  didn’t   exist   in   the  United  States  
until the late 1800s.  So now you have an investigative body that simply 
didn’t   exist,   but   at   the   time,   these   procedural   protections  were   created in 
the body in the Bill of Rights.  Organized criminality was not an issue.  
What about the distinction now that is pressing so much public policy be-
tween criminality and terror, or between terror and war?  The tripartite rela-
tionship between those three was not really well thought out and contem-
plated. 
Well, in any event, I could give other examples—organized criminali-
ty; that was not what people were thinking about when they were thinking 
about  the  criminal  process.    It  just  was  not  on  anybody’s  radar screen.  And 
the world we now deal with is just not the world we had then.  And more 
importantly, there has been not just a change, which is a common factor in 
these discussions, but in fact, things exist now that literally were not con-
ceived of.  Now at  that  point,  you  can  start  analogizing,  and  that’s  what  you  
do with respect to wiretapping.  Some people respond by saying, well, rea-
sonable  this,  reasonable  that.    Well,  you  can  start  an  analogy,  but  you  can’t  
formalize analogy.  You can analogize in one way; I can analogize in 
another.  And there is no formal means of adjudicating over those analo-
gies.  That means you are divorced from any algorithmic conclusions dri-
ven by your methodology. 
Now the last point, if I could have one more minute — 
 
JUDGE CLEMENT: Yes. 
 
PROFESSOR ALLEN:—one more minute.  A cautious and hesitat-
ing one more minute, but— 
 
JUDGE CLEMENT: You’re  the  math  major. 
 
PROFESSOR ALLEN:—one more minute because I think this is re-
ally the most important point from my point of view, again, as a self-
conceited scientist.  Why do these theories seem to have so little bite, even 
though you argue about them so vociferously?  I think it is because they 
misconceive the object of their theorizing. 
Again, those of you who know about the literature in evidence, in par-
ticular, we know a fair amount about the relationship between complexity 
and decision-making.  And you can say some systematic things about what 
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can be captured by deductive algorithmic top-down theories and what res-
ists them.  Issues like ambiguity, unpredictability, the significance of com-
mon sense, actually describe or predict the extent to which areas of law are 
capture-able, or at least have been captured, by algorithms, like, for exam-
ple, microeconomics, which does capture antitrust but does not capture 
negligence. 
Now, when you look at the constitutional interpretive process, it is 
highly ambiguous, very unpredictable, and probably requires common 
sense.  So I would predict as a scientist that this is exactly the area that is 
going to avoid algorithmic solutions.  So, I think in fact what you do when 
you start trying to reduce constitutional interpretation to a relatively 
straightforward or simple theory is that you are neglecting that it simply 
does not capture the reality of the object being theorized, and as a result, it 
resists it. 
So, I think from my point of view, from my own professional point of 
view, that is the most interesting thing about this.  From your point of view, 
it is probably uninteresting entirely, and we can go on after this and talk 
about normative questions about originalism and so on.  But I did want to 
emphasize it because what I predicted that no matter how much we talk 
about this, you are going to continue to see exactly what I went through.  
The Court has done it the last two terms, and it captures 50 years of their 
jurisprudence, that it is going to raise these kinds of arguments as tools 
when they are appropriate.  But the idea that any particular tool, whether 
it’s   originalism,   strict   construction,   textualism, whatever, will be a domi-
nant theme and a dominant determinant of outcomes, is simply going to be 
falsified by the facts. 
Thank you. 
 
JUDGE CLEMENT: I’m  not  sure  you  answered  the  “should”  ques-
tion,  but  you’re  out  of  time.    But  you  can  use  it  in  your  rebuttal. 
 
PROFESSOR ALLEN: Sorry. 
 
JUDGE CLEMENT: Mr. Wray—Assistant Attorney General. 
 
HON. MR. WRAY: Not anymore.  I just saw some of my former col-
leagues in the Criminal Division, and I am busy frantically thinking wheth-
er I am about to repudiate some position I took, and so I am sure that they 
will tell me I am being inconsistent with my own original understanding.  
But I think when you start talking about something like originalism, to set 
it up the way the Federalist Society always does, and which I think makes it 
more interesting, is a pro-con kind of debate.  It is probably sort of decep-
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tively simple because I do not think anybody who is a proponent of origi-
nalism, which I consider myself to be, advocates using originalism to the 
exclusion of every other is interpretive tool, like textualism, looking at the 
landscape of precedent, and so on so forth.  So it has to be considered as 
one of many tools, and not the only tool. 
The second thing I guess I would say is that, if you are going to be 
against it, then the obvious question comes up, well, what are you going to 
propose instead?  Craig went over that little bit at the beginning, and trying 
to keep things within time limits went over it pretty quickly.  But I think 
the points that he summarized quickly are important, because as hard as it 
may be sometimes to figure out what the original understanding was, if you 
do not look at something like that, then I think you end up looking at some-
thing like what side of the bed the judge got up on that morning, and which 
newspaper he likes to read the most, and which editorial page he subscribes 
to the most and worries about getting hammered in the most.  And that 
starts to become, at least to my mind, a little bit more like the finger to the 
wind judicial interpretation, which if you are trying to promote stability and 
predictability  and  consistency,  if  you’re  trying  to  have  a  limited  role  for  the  
judiciary, I think you have to look at things like originalism.  So I would 
say to the critics of originalism, if not that, what else?  And I would like to 
hear the defense of what that would be. 
But to say that using originalism in this arena in particular is a good 
idea, does that mean that doing that by itself will answer the question be-
fore any given court in any given case?  No, I think not.  And does it mean 
that you are even able to find the original understanding in every case?  I 
do not think so, either.  But not being able to find something and just not 
looking for it are two very different things.  Like I said, if you are not going 
to look for it, then you have got to wonder what else you are going to be 
looking at. 
The third thing I would say is that just to say that looking at the origi-
nal meaning in the context of criminal procedure, does that mean that you 
are necessarily going to only be looking at criminal enforcement tech-
niques, investigative techniques, processes and procedures and so forth that 
were in existence at the time of the framing, or at least contemplated at the 
time of the framing?  Again, I think not.  I think the answer is somewhat 
like what now Chief Justice Roberts said in his confirmation hearing, 
which is where there are very broad terms reflecting broad principles that 
the framers chose, I think I prefer to assume they did that deliberately 
knowing that they were not going to be able to anticipate techniques and 
technologies and so forth, but that they wanted to have some level of con-
sistency in the principals in terms of how they were going to be applied for 
all those unforeseen facts. 
So, that to me starts to come down to what is it you are going to draw 
from the historical evidence?  Do you just look at it and say, well, they 
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didn’t   contemplate   heat-seeking sensors, so forget all the original under-
standings of the Fourth Amendment?  Well, I do not think so.  But it does 
make it a lot harder to figure out what you can draw.  And there are things, 
to take the Kyllo case as an example, where I think the original understand-
ing helps limit just how far afield the court can get.  It does not get you all 
the way there; it does not get you to the final answer of the question.  But 
things like the sanctity of the home, the notion that the home is the sort of 
quintessential protected location for search purposes, is a principle that you 
can glean from that is historical evidence and keeps the Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence that the Court engages and from getting, I would argue, way 
adrift. 
I share some of the disappointment that some of the others have arti-
culated, that the Court did not take that historical analysis as far as it could 
in Kyllo.  But I would argue the way to reconcile Kyllo with some of the 
other cases in the same arena is that it is, in fact, based in part on original 
understanding of the Fourth Amendment. 
For example, that very principle—the   idea   that   a  man’s   home   is   his  
castle, and so on and so forth—if you put the Kyllo case and the heat-
seeking device used they are up against cases like Caballes,46 which in-
volved detection dogs on things like cars, or the cave, the Dow Chemical47 
case that was referenced earlier involving flyovers, the way to understand 
those cases as being consistent with each other is based, I think, on that 
principle that the home is different.  There is obviously a lot more to it, but 
I  don’t  think  saying  that the original understanding does not get you all the 
way there is the same thing as saying it is irrelevant or inappropriate to use. 
Another example in the Fourth Amendment context might be in the 
context of seizure.  Justice Scalia, I think, wrote a pretty persuasive opinion 
for the Court in the Hodari D. case, in which he looked to the original 
meaning  to  say  that  seizure  can’t  be  understood  to  include  a  guy  who  sees  a  
cop walking towards him and runs away with no physical force, not even 
any physical touching, that that is not a seizure.48  It seems to me pretty 
logical, and maybe they would have gotten that way without looking at the 
original meaning, but I have to believe that doing so helped in that particu-
lar case. 
That does not mean that original meaning is not messy, and some of 
the cases you have heard about today illustrate that point.  The sentencing 
cases are a classic example.  Although the Court purported to ground its re-
jection of the sentencing guidelines as then written on historical evidence—
I am no historical scholar, but from what I have seen—the historical record 
is a lot murkier and a lot more unclear than the Court would suggest, and 
 
 46 Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005). 
 47 Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986). 
 48 California v. Hodari, 499 U.S. 621, 626 (1991). 
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that right around the time of the framing, courts were moving away from 
determinant sentencing into sentencing within a range.  And essentially, the 
criminal procedure in that very area was in flux at the time of the framing. 
Therefore, you have to sort of look at, well, what was not in flux at the 
time of the framing?  Well, what was not in flux were certain things that I 
think all the members of the Court seemed to agree on.  One, a jury has to 
find beyond a reasonable doubt the elements of the offense; fine.  But two, 
the judges had pretty broad discretion to look at certain facts, to impose a 
sentence within  the  range,  whether  that’s  zero  to  whatever  the  penalty  was.    
At least most of the members of the Court profess not to disagree with that 
proposition. 
So then, the question becomes the issue that was actually presented in 
the case, which was if it is okay for a judge to sentence based on facts that 
he or she alone finds at sentencing as aggravating or mitigating the defen-
dant’s  conduct,  anywhere  from  a  range  of,  say,  zero  to  life,  it  seems  pretty  
clear that that is constitutional.  All the guidelines do, in effect, is structure 
or shape that discretion within the range.  Is there any reason to think the 
historical evidence suggests that that suddenly transforms what would oth-
erwise be constitutional scheme into an unconstitutional one?  And I did 
not see anything in any of the opinions that bore on that point.  So, again, 
does that mean that the historical evidence is irrelevant?  No, it just means 
that it did not get the Court all the way to the answer.  In that particular 
case it left a morass that those of us who are on either side of the criminal 
justice system are still unraveling. 
Crawford,49 which was also mentioned, is another example of where it 
gets pretty messy.  But again, messy and irrelevant are not the same thing.  
It is pretty clear that from the historical evidence that is recited in that opi-
nion that the Roberts50 case, which essentially allows the admission of out-
of-court  testimonial  statements,  based  solely  on  a  judge’s  finding  of  relia-
bility, trustworthiness, and so on.  But to take it to the next step and sort of 
categorically exclude all such statements is not so clear, and if you look at 
those opinions, one of the things that I think is interesting is there is a pret-
ty lengthy historical debate between Justice Scalia writing for the Court, 
and Chief Justice Rehnquist on the other side also pointing to historical 
evidence.  The fact that there is a debate, I would suggest, means that—let 
me step back.  The fact that there is a debate over the historical evidence 
does not mean that that evidence is irrelevant.  It just means that it is hard-
er. 
But again, I come back to the point that I made at the beginning, 
which is just because something is hard does not mean it is irrelevant, and 
if you are not going to use something like originalism along with other 
 
 49 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 50 Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
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tools like textualism, then you have to ask, what are people going to be us-
ing instead.  And I think the reality is you pretty quickly degenerate into 
judges using their own subjective policy preferences to fill the gaps that 
they would otherwise be able to fill using originalism.  So I would argue 
that it is relevant, it is appropriate, but like anything else, it has its caveats 
and qualifiers and limits to its utility. 
Thank you. 
 
JUDGE CLEMENT: Thank you, Chris. 
I think Professor Steiker is   about   to   answer   Chris’s   question:   if   not  
originalism, what else? 
 
PROFESSOR STEIKER: Actually, I was not planning to do that, 
but I can try.  I will.  Ask me anything. 
I am very happy to be here to participate in this event.  I always ad-
mire and enjoy the events that the local and the national chapters of the Fe-
deralist Society put on, and I am very pleased to be here. 
What I plan to do—though  I  will  accept  the  Judge’s  challenge  to  a  cer-
tain extent—was something a little bit narrower, perhaps either correctly or 
incorrectly interpreting the point of this particular panel.  The conversation 
thus far has been at a very abstract level about the virtues and vices in gen-
eral  of  originalism  as  an  interpretive  methodology.    And  I  think  we’ve  had  
a very interesting  discussion  that’s  pointed  out  most  of  the  main  things  that  
originalism has to say for itself and what people, the proponents of it, seek 
to achieve by it and some of the concerns and the limitations of it.  I guess 
the question that I had in mind was, is there anything in particular about the 
context of criminal procedure that would suggest that originalism is either a 
more or less appropriate tool in the toolbox of interpretive moves. 
I guess I was going to make a somewhat more modest point that, at 
least in a certain large part of the context of criminal procedure—that is, 
the context of the regulation of police practices generally, which is the en-
tire scope, pretty much, of the Fourth Amendment, and part of the scope of 
the Fifth and Sixth amendments as well, there are a lot of reasons to be 
more skeptical about originalism than just generally as an interpretive me-
thodology.  I was going to point out three reasons why we might, in that 
context, have more concerns about originalism as a tool than in others.  But 
I will also try to answer—in my twelve minutes or so—what, if not origi-
nalism,   then  what?     Because   I   think   the  “then  what”  has  been   implicit   in  
what has been said, and I will just try to make it a little more explicit. 
So, what are the three reasons why I think the criminal procedure con-
text is not welcoming soil for originalism as a methodology.  One has to do 
with   a   point   that  was   in   fact  Chris’s   point,   and   in   fact  Chief   Justice  Ro-
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berts’  point  during  his  confirmation  hearings,  which  is  that  not all parts of 
the Constitution speak at equal levels of generality, and sometimes it seems 
positively clear that the framers themselves were not seeking to constrain 
future generations.  Now, many people have sought to make this point gen-
erally about originalism.  The framers themselves were not originalists and 
didn’t  seek  to  bind  future  generations  to  their  particular  conceptions  of  the  
shape of constitutional prohibitions and rights. 
But in the Fourth Amendment context, in particular, it is very hard to 
think that the framers meant to bind future generations because it is one of 
the few provisions of the Constitution that actually adverts to the idea of 
reasonableness, or actually unreasonableness.  But the proscription of un-
reasonable searches and seizures without further definition positively in-
vites future generations and future constructions of reasonableness.  A lot 
of the debate in originalism is whether we ought to look at the common law 
at the time of the founding, and there is some debate about which founding.  
Is it the actual founding of the Constitution in 1789 or 1791?  Or, is it the 
later founding of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, through 
which the Fourth Amendment was incorporated?  So was it 1868, or was it 
1791?  But in either case, the question is what were the particular things 
that were thought to be reasonable or unreasonable then, or do we take the 
concept of unreasonableness and try to apply it to new—are we to think of 
ourselves as bound by the particular things that were thought to be reason-
able or unreasonable at the time?  That is the first argument. 
And it is somewhat ironic that—I had not thought about this in these 
terms,  but  Ron’s  comments  made  me  think  that  it  is  somewhat  ironic  that  a  
bigger bite of originalism has been in the Fourth Amendment area, where 
we have seen a lot of Fourth Amendment originalist opinions, at least at the 
Supreme Court level, and fewer in areas where the text of the Constitution, 
at least, seems to invite that much less, in the Sixth Amendment and all 
criminal prosecutions.  It is amazing the contortions the Supreme Court has 
gone  through  to  interpret  “all”  as  meaning,  “well,  some,  but  not  every  sin-
gle  one.”    So  it  is  a  little  bit  ironic  that  some  of  the  parts  of  the  Constitution  
that least invite broader conceptualization have gone the non-originalist 
route, and the provision that seems to most invite it has been the object of a 
lot of work of originalism. 
In a piece that I wrote51 responding to an essentially originalist ap-
proach to the Fourth Amendment by Akhil Amar, who I know is here to-
day, I said that there were two important changes in historical context from 
the 18th to the 20th century that should really inform our idea of what 
things are reasonable or unreasonable—searches and seizures under the 
Fourth Amendment—and one of the two that I pointed out, which was 
pointed out by Ron, is the development of police as a social institution. 
 
 51 See Carol Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 820 (1994). 
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At the time of the founding, there was no such thing as professional 
police forces.  It was all an informal, unprofessional constabulary and the 
duty  of  “watch  and  ward”  and  the  posse comitatus and  the  “hue  and  cry”  in  
the marketplace, there was no professional law enforcement.  And the de-
velopment of professional police forces in the mid-1800s, I argued in this 
piece, necessitated a change in the way we thought about what kinds of 
searches and seizures were reasonable and unreasonable. 
The other change, a big change certainly from the 18th century, and a 
change that precipitated the Due Process Clause, is the problem of racism 
in the United States and having large populations of different races that 
lived in cities and that were disproportionately or differently policed by 
professional police forces also led to different concerns.  These are some-
what different points that I made my article, but since almost no one here 
probably has read that article, I have no hesitation with diverging from my 
own prior views. 
But the two more pragmatic points that I wanted to make that you 
could generate from those differences have to do with the fact that the po-
lice provisions of the Constitution have audiences that are unique, and for 
whom originalism is going to be very unhelpful as a way for them to figure 
out either their constitutional duties or their constitutional rights.  So, con-
stitutional duties—who is the primary audience of the Fourth Amendment?  
It is law enforcement.  And it is a really serious problem to have an origi-
nalist methodology that tells law enforcement agents and institutions that 
the way to figure out what your duties are is to get some staff historians and 
find out what was permitted exactly at common law in, you know, the mid-
dle of the 18th century.  I think this is really a problem, and you can see it 
in many of the debates about individual provisions about what exactly the 
history of the late 18th century showed. 
How in the world are police departments supposed to train their forces 
and predict the future trends in the Supreme Court, if originalism is the me-
thodology?  I would like to add a friendly   amendment   to  Craig  Lerner’s  
suggestion that the Supreme Court justices ride circuit.  I would like them 
to go on police patrol ride-alongs.  Have them ride with the police and rule 
from the back seat.  You know, what can you do without being able to call 
down to the Supreme Court librarian and have them bring up the common 
law of 1782 for them to consult?  So I think that is a real problem. 
And the other problem is a more abstract version of the same problem, 
which is that in order for law enforcement to be able to predict future cas-
es—the way we do it now, the way we train as law professors, the three of 
us here, what we drill and what you all will remember from your own days 
from law school—happily, I hope, but perhaps not—is that the primary me-
thodology that we teach is analogy.  Now Ron criticizes theory, high 
theory, as a general rule because he says analogy, deciding things by anal-
ogy, is insufficiently—what is the word he used?  Algorithmic; I just like 
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that as an adjective—insufficiently algorithmic. 
But here, I would like to borrow a little bit from Chris.  What is the al-
ternative?  When you consider what the alternative to deciding by analogy 
is, each particular question requires that call down to the Supreme Court 
library to find out what the practice exactly was here, in that particular con-
text, in the 1700s.  And if all we can do is fill in little points on the map, 
one by one, by reference to historical practice, there is absolutely no way to 
predict the future in any particular way.  Right now, we can try to predict 
by analogy. 
So, the Supreme Court says you need a warrant to search a home.  
You do not need a warrant to search a car.  Do you need a warrant to search 
a Winnebago?  This was actually a question until the Supreme Court de-
cided it.52  But in deciding whether you need a warrant to search a Winne-
bago, did you have to try to find out what the thought was about Winneba-
gos, or shall we say, covered wagons that people lived in back in the 
1790s?  Or could you try to reason by analogy: why was it that you needed 
a warrant to search a home and why was it that you did not need a warrant 
to search a car?  And it is only if you allow decision by analogy that you 
can have this kind of predictability, which is what I urge that in police prac-
tices is a much more important value—it is always an important value, but 
it has the supreme importance, unique importance, in the context of police 
practices that make originalism truly more problematic. 
The other audience—this is my third point, and I think I may have to 
stop here—but my third point is that the other audience of police practices, 
aside from the police, is the policed—the people with whom the police 
have the most and interaction.  And the concern so far, one of the main at-
tractions of originalism, and it is an attraction to me as well as to any think-
ing person, is the idea of constraint—constraint of judicial authority, of 
democratic accountability, and the idea that we would have a written con-
stitution that would constrain judges is of course a kind of legitimacy that is 
extremely attractive. 
But there is a flip side to legitimacy, and that is that constitutional ad-
judication appears to take seriously the concerns of the moment and the 
concerns of people.  And so, this is where the issue of race comes in.  It is 
impossible without some kind of normative discussion about what the real 
problems are, as opposed to simply what the particular conceptions of the 
framers were in 1791, that is necessary for the evolution of constitutional 
rights to have legitimacy in the eyes of the people whose rights it deli-
neates. 
And I guess in this context, I think of the recent events in France over 
the last few weeks, and the images on television of gangs of minority youth 
 
 52 California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985). 
ORIGINALISM_AND_CRIMINAL_Law_Panel_277-306 4/10/2008 6:46 PM 
2008] Originalism and Criminal Law and Procedure  299 
out of control and burning police departments and attacking police officers, 
partly out of a sense of outrage that their concerns and their rights, if you 
will, have not been taken sufficiently seriously, and that to have a kind of 
constitutional discourse that refuses, eschews any talk of a normative basis 
for rights, I think runs the risk of lack of legitimacy in this other way. 
So, I am going to close with an example, and then ten seconds of re-
sponse—I   think   I   have   implicitly   answered   the   “what’s   the   alternative”  
question.  The example is the Supreme  Court’s  decision  in  Atwater.53  That 
is what I refer to as the soccer mom case, the woman with her two kids in 
the  pickup,  who  was  stopped  by  a  police  officer  because  they  didn’t  have  
their seatbelts on, and the police officer did a full custodial arrest and took 
her away in handcuffs.54  And the question was, is it a reasonable or unrea-
sonable search and seizure for the police to conduct a full custodial arrest 
for a merely fineable misdemeanor offense?55 
This goes all way up to the Supreme Court, and judges and justices all 
along the way disagree about whether or not this would have been consi-
dered reasonable in 1789.  Ultimately, the Supreme Court decides that the 
history does not render it unreasonable,56 but the lack of the ability of all 
these judges, with all their law clerks, with all of their libraries, to come to 
any  definitive  answers  should  give  us  pause  as  to  whether  or  not  that’s  real-
ly a good way to decide that question. 
And then after the Supreme Court decides—Justice Souter for the ma-
jority decides, you know, we really cannot decide based on the history that 
this was unreasonable, so what do we have to look at?  We have to look at, 
he says—and it is clear that the Court really wants to look at this—is this a 
really big problem?  Are there a lot of cops out there who are conducting 
custodial arrests of people for merely fineable, non-jailable misdemeanors?  
And the answer is no, it does not seem to be a very big problem.  And he 
basically said, call me if it gets to be a big problem and we will talk about it 
then. 
But  the  “call  me  if  it  gets  to  be  a  big  problem,”  the  idea  that  somehow  
the bigness of the problem, the extent to which this is a concern that this 
should be something we should be concerned about, the inability of origi-
nalism to ask that question at all or to answer it, I contend is a problem.  
Granted, it opens the door to what Chris might call policy preferences, but 
it is only through frank discussion of the normative underpinnings of the 
nature of constitutional rights can a certain kind of legitimacy attend to de-
cisions of this kind. 
So the question is, what is the alternative?  The alternative, I have to 
 
 53 Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001). 
 54 Id. at 323–24. 
 55 Id. at 326. 
 56 Id. at 355. 
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say, is not a complete disregard of the constitutional text and saying, you 
know, the Constitution says something about searches and seizures, and al-
lows you to judge—I am not a judge, but if I were—allows me, the judge, 
to decide whatever I want.  It is rather a displacement of particular concep-
tions with a broader level of generality, with the idea of concepts and con-
ceptions. 
A lot of this work has been done up at the level of theory by people 
like Ronald Dworkin, but I think that is the counter-originalist move, the 
idea to move to a level of generality, at which the paticular conceptions of 
the framers about reasonableness give way to a broader concept of reason-
ableness, which requires some normative underpinnings, some frank dis-
cussion  of  the  “shoulds,”   the   things  that  Ron  wanted   to  avoid,  but   I   think  
that constitutional adjudication cannot and should not avoid. 
Thank you. 
 
JUDGE CLEMENT: The last I heard—I admit I have not heard the 
news this afternoon since we were driving in from Charlottesville—was 
that in France they had immediately arrested, convicted, and were deport-
ing these people.  So that is a whole other constitutional procedure that we 
will not be faced with, I have a feeling, since we do have a constitution. 
Would any of the panelists like to give a very short rebuttal before we 
open the floor to questions and answers? 
Ron. 
 
PROFESSOR ALLEN: Very briefly.  I agree with Professor Steiker 
that the police are one of the intended audiences of the Supreme Court.  But 
I guess the message is what police hear is not necessarily the message the 
Supreme Court wants them to hear.  And this is the functionalist point that 
they are not equipped to monitor any of this.  So take Miranda.57  Miranda 
is not a bad rule in terms of monitoring the police and regulating them.  It is 
not a bad legislative rule; of course, it was not enacted by legislature.  So 
here is the problem.  The Supreme Court is now in the business of sort of 
evolving Miranda. 
My favorite case is Oregon v. Elstad.58  This is this case in which they 
had a non-Mirandized confession, then they gave the guy Miranda rights, 
and then they get another confession.59  And so, the Supreme Court says, 
you  know,  “this  is  okay.”60  This is 1985.  Little did they know that for the 
next 20 years, this was in police manuals; this is exactly what they taught: 
 
 57 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 486 (1966). 
 58 Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985). 
 59 Id. at 300–01. 
 60 Id. at 309. 
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get a guy in, jam him up, get him to confess, then Mirandize him, then get 
another confession.  It happened for 20 years before the Supreme Court 
knew about this in the Siebert case61—so the whole point is that if this is 
done legislatively, there is probably a better equipment for monitoring and 
checking it. 
And finally, on the reasonableness point, I agree; reasonableness 
seems to invite a kind of balancing of privacy interests versus law en-
forcement   needs.      It   is,   I   think,   checked   by   this   person’s   papers,   houses,  
and effects, so I think that is a cabining of what is being talked about.  And 
also, I think reasonableness, to me—since it involves this balancing, again 
returning to my corporation point—to me, it raises the question of why is 
the Supreme Court dictating a uniform police manual given the fact that 
reasonableness might differ in Utah and in inner-city Washington, DC.  I 
mean, it seems to me this is crying out for local jurisdictions to evolve dif-
ferently.  And so, I will leave it at that. 
 
JUDGE CLEMENT: Thank you. 
Yes, Chris. 
 
HON. MR. WRAY: I guess I wanted to respond to the same point, 
but in a slightly different way, which, as I said before, if the question is not 
originalism, then what, and what I heard was normative underpinnings, 
Dworkin, the concerns of the moment, and as somebody who has actually 
spent a good part of my career as a prosecutor working with the police and 
law enforcement, sometimes in the process of training them, I would not 
suggest for a minute that studying the common law and Blackstone and 
everything else is something I would recommend for the local police offic-
er.  But most of them learn from lawyers working with them in their juris-
dictions, and most of those lawyers, and the police who work with them, 
would feel far more comfortable trying to figure out and predict where they 
can go with something like originalism as part of the calculus, rather than 
worrying about whether they draw this judge or that judge, or are they 
going to be in Los Angeles or Richmond?  And so I guess I would say at 
the end of the day, is it perfect?  No.  But is it superior?  I would say yes. 
As to the discussion of the situation in France, I guess I just cannot 
help but remark that it reinforces my view that that is why we should not be 
looking at French law. 
 
PROFESSOR LERNER: Are you done, Chris? 
 
 
 61 Missouri v. Seibert, 542 US 600 (2004). 
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HON. MR. WRAY: I am. 
 
PROFESSOR LERNER: I would like to just sharpen this discussion 
a little bit with four quick points.  I may be the outlier here, but these kinds 
of conversations seem to make sense to me only if the theory that is been 
advanced has a sharp edge to it.  That is, originalism or textualism or what-
ever it is that you are talking about dominates over other things, because if 
the issue is instead, is originalism or textualism or whatever a variable to be 
taken into account in a judgmental process, that is banal.  Of course it is.  
No one is going to deny those points.  It becomes uninteresting. 
Second, I just do not understand an argument that says something 
along   the  following   lines:  “the  first   five  steps  of   the  argument  can  be  de-
ductive and the last two can be non-deductive,”  which   sounds   to  me   like  
what one is saying when it says originalism takes us part of the way but not 
all the way.  I mean, that sounds like you have assumptions, you deduce 
things from them, you get to step four in the argument, but then step five 
and step six are not deductive.  Well, if they are not deductive, you have no 
reason to think the conclusion bears any relationship to those assumptions 
that began that deduction.  So I am literally mystified by what that might 
mean. 
Third, to be clear, I was not attacking analogy—not that anybody 
thought I was—I was describing analogy.  You cannot formalize it.  That 
does not mean it is not useful.  Analogical reasoning is terribly useful.  So 
are conventions, so is common sense, in a judgmental process.  But when 
you shift from judgmental terms to analytical terms, back to deduction and 
hard edges, you have a different story, a different problem. 
And fourth—this leads me to just my last point—no one is claiming 
that things like originalism should be completely disregarded.  To say it is 
not an entire story is not to say the opposite, that it is completely irrelevant.  
Again, in a judgmental context, of course original meaning and all these 
other things plausibly can matter.  Maybe you want to say they should mat-
ter.  It is okay with me.  To me, the interesting question is, how do you go 
about regulating this complex process? 
 
JUDGE CLEMENT: Thank you.  If you have a question, you need 
to get in line.  We have two people lined up.  And let me remind you, the 
focus is on the question, not the statement. 
Yes sir. 
 
AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: My name is Ken Bishop.  My ques-
tion  is  simple.     What  does  “the  people”   in   the  Fourth  Amendment  mean?    
With regard to the French situation, are those  members  of  “the  people,”  if  it  
ORIGINALISM_AND_CRIMINAL_Law_Panel_277-306 4/10/2008 6:46 PM 
2008] Originalism and Criminal Law and Procedure  303 
were in the United States?  With regard to illegal aliens, undocumented 
workers, people who do not contribute to the society in the United States, 
should they be protected by the Fourth Amendment?  This issue is raised 
by Chief Justice Rehnquist in the Verdugo62 case.  I think it was about a 
1995 case.  And I would like the members of the panel to address the 
meaning  of  “the  people.” 
 
JUDGE CLEMENT: By inclusion or exclusion? 
 
AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: Whichever way it pleases them. 
 
PROFESSOR LERNER: When I used to teach criminal procedure, I 
loved that because I remember in that case, Chief Justice Rehnquist says 
“people”  is  a  term  of  art,63 and we see it first in the Preamble, so it gives 
me an opportunity to sing what I learned.  “WE THE PEOPLE of the United 
States, in  Order  to  form  a  more  perfect  Union,  establish  justice”64—and so I 
think his point there is that the people obviously means us, Americans here.  
So that is the argument that we should not extend the Fourth Amendment 
rights to outsiders, I suppose.  But I am not sure if others on the panel 
would agree with that. 
 
HON. MR. WRAY: Do you remember the facts of Verdugo? 
 
AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: I confess, not. 
 
HON. MR. WRAY: A drug trafficker was arrested by the DEA in 
Mexico and brought to the United States and incarcerated.65  He was raised 
in the United States.  It was an unreasonable search and seizure issue, and 
the  U.S.  Supreme  Court  found  that  he  was  not  “a  member  of  the  people,”  
and therefore he had no Fourth Amendment rights.  I think that might be a 
good way of handling undocumented aliens. 
 
JUDGE CLEMENT: Did you have a comment, Ron? 
Thank you, sir.  Next. 
 
 
 62 United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990). 
 63 Id. at 265. 
 64 U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
 65 Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 262–63. 
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AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: With respect to search and seizure, do 
you see probable cause warrant requirements as consistent with original-
ism?  And do you view originalism with respect to reasonableness as a 
question of determining what was thought to be reasonable at the time un-
der historic circumstances, or reasonableness as an issue to be determined 
by juries in civil damages actions without immunity? 
 
PROFESSOR ALLEN: Let me answer that one— 
 
JUDGE CLEMENT: All right, Ron. 
 
PROFESSOR ALLEN: —because I can say a good word for origi-
nalism.  Well, I could look at the text and see probable cause in warrants 
there, so I am pretty sure they were thinking about probable cause and war-
rants.  Of course, that answers very little as to what they thought that meant 
and how we should construe the clause, but sure, they were there. 
 
JUDGE CLEMENT: Carol. 
 
PROFESSOR STEIKER: Well, I mean, this is actually the subject 
of the article, the debate,66 that Akhil Amar and I had these many years ago 
because he argues that although warrants and probable cause are in the 
Constitution, they actually are in there to limit the use of warrants, not to 
enshrine warrants as the gold standard for constitutional reasonableness, 
because what courts have done is read the two clauses together: there shall 
be no unreasonable searches and seizures, and no warrants shall issue but 
upon probable cause.  So, Professor Amar, who took an essentially origi-
nalist approach, argued that probable cause and warrants were actually a 
way of limiting the warrant; the warrant was a bad thing; and the Fourth 
Amendment limited the use of warrants as opposed to enshrine to them as 
the ultimate standard. 
I actually—there are many other historians who have disagreed with 
him on that and there is a range historical debate about what—this goes to 
my point about, if historians cannot agree, this is one of the problems of 
originalism because there is a huge debate among historians about the rela-
tionship of the two clauses of the Fourth Amendment.  I argued that there 
were reasons of changed circumstance, that the conception of reasonable-
ness should let us consider things like professional police forces and prob-
lems of racism, something that originalism, that the whole originalist de-
 
 66 See generally Akhil R. Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757 
(1994); Steiker, supra note 51. 
ORIGINALISM_AND_CRIMINAL_Law_Panel_277-306 4/10/2008 6:46 PM 
2008] Originalism and Criminal Law and Procedure  305 
bate has to elide because it is just not relevant to the question of the 
tionship between warrants and probable cause. 
 
JUDGE CLEMENT: Thank you. 
Yes, sir. 
 
AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: I am wondering if an originalist pers-
pective in criminal procedure should perhaps incorporate a Michael H.67 
approach to the level of generality question, which would then set the pre-
ference towards the lowest level of generality in order to achieve a more 
restrained judicial interpretive method. 
 
JUDGE CLEMENT: Any comments? 
 
PROFESSOR LERNER: I  think  that’s  my  position,  but—I embrace 
that, yes. 
 
HON. MR. WRAY: I mean, all these questions are good questions, 
but they are just reiterating the problem.  There are lots of ways to con-
strain or to liberalize judgment, right?  That might get one good one.  And 
it is hard to imagine how you would think systematically about that without 
being pragmatic from beginning to end.  You would ask questions—“what 
would the consequences of that be?  What would be the consequences of 
the  alternatives?”—and so on.  And as soon as you start doing that, unless I 
am missing something, you give up any claim to originalism, not that I 
heard you arguing for it, but you give up any claim to originalism. 
 
PROFESSOR ALLEN: I thought the point was that originalism is 
“look  at  the  plain  text  through  the  original  meaning,”  and  I  think  the  argu-
ment would be that if you are doing that, you discover that the Constitution 
does not cover as many things as perhaps now the Supreme Court has in-
terpreted it to mean.  So it would effectively result in greater judicial re-
straint.  I mean, it is not inconsistent with originalism. 
 
HON. MR. WRAY: I did not say it was inconsistent with original-
ism.  I said it was not derivable from it or driven by it.  It is consistent with 
lots of theories. 
 
 
 67 See Michael. H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989). 
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JUDGE CLEMENT: All right.  Can we have a round of applause for 
our excellent panelists. 
(Panel concluded.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
